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urgent need to suppress the habitual criminals who are so
rampant today.9
RUSSELL S. MACHMER.
EQUITY DELIGHTS TO DO JUSTICE AND NOT
BY HALVES-This maxim, although not often quoted in
the opinions of the courts is, nevertheless, one of the most
important of the maxims of equity. The significance of the
maxim lies in its last words. It means that it iS the aim of
equity to have all interested parties in court and to render
a complete decree, adjusting all rights and protecting the
parties against future litigation. The principle of the
maxim embraces the well-established doctrine that when
equity once acquires jurisdiction it will retain it so as to
afford complete relief." The maxim does not always ap-
pear in exactly the above words,2 but the rules applicable
are the same,
Professor Bisphan in his book "Principles of Equity"
does not recognize the maxim as a distinct one, but rather
OSee 42 Harvard Law Review 832 for brief criticism.
121 Corpus Juris p. 198, Par. 187; Piro v. Shipley, 33 Pa. Super.
278 (1907).
2This maxim does not appear in Francis, in Pomeroy, nor in
Story Eq. Jur., but is given in Story Ed. Pl. Sec. 72. The other
statements of the rule are: 1-"Equity does nothing by halves." Lat-
imer v. Irish-American Bank, 119 Ga. 887, 47 S. E. 322, (1904). 2-"It
is characteristic of equity to do justice, and not by halves." Beville
v. Boyd, 16 Tex. Civ. A. 491, 42 S. W. 318, (1897). 3-"A court of
equity ought to do justice completely, and not by halves." Camp v.
Boyd, 229 U. S. 530, (1912). 4-"Equity does nothing grudgingly or by
halves. Its outstretched arm corrects but with loving kindness with-
aL" Stitt v. Stitt, 205 Mo. 155, 103 S. W. 547 (1907). 5-"When equity
lays hold of a subject-matter it does not lift its hand until plenary
and perfect justice is done as near as may be under the issues!.
Jelly v. Lamar, 242 Mo. 44, 145 S. W. 799, (1912). 6.-"It is the de-
sire as well as the duty of this court never to do justice by the halves,
-never merely to beget business for another court,--and never, when
a case is fairly within its jurisdiction to leave open the door for liti-
gation farther or in any other place, if It can possibly be here closed."
Decker v. Caskey, I N. J. Eq. 427. 7-"Equity will not permit litiga-
tion by piecemeal, but will determine the whole controversy where
all the facts and parties are before it." Curtin v. Krohn, 4 Cal, A.
131, 87 Pac. 243, (1906).
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regards it as being ancillary to the maxim that "Equity
will not suffer a wrong to be without a remedy." He cites
as an example of the latter maxim that courts of equity
have no jurisdiction to give damages or compensation,
when these constitute the sole grounds of the bill, but that
where the bill seeks other relief which can be had in equity
alone and damages are incidental to this relief, equity hav-
ing proper possession of the case will proceed to determine
the whole case. This maxim is indeed the source of the
whole of equity jurisdiction, as it affords a relief wherever
a right exists, and no adequate remedy at law is available.
The maxim is sometimes vindicated by denying that a
wrong exists when no remedy can be afforded. Butthemax-
im that "Equity delights to do justice and not by halves" is
not an independent source of jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is
a prerequisite to its application. Moreover, an adequate
remedy at law is no bar to the application of the maxim
once equity has jurisdiction of the case.'
The following rules govern the application of the
maxim:
Rule 1. When a court of equity acquires jurisdiction
of a controversy for any purpose, it will, as a general rule,
proceed to determine the whole controversy and to award
complete relief, although in so doing it may decide purely
common law reliefs, which standing alone would furnish no
basis for equity jurisdiction. One of the most outstanding,
as well as one of the earliest, cases showing the application
of this particular phase of the maxim, is that of McGowin
v. Remington.4 In that case the defendant was in possession
of certain chattels belonging to the claimant.' Some of the
chattels had an unique value for the plaintiff, and he sued
in equity to have the specific chattels of unique value re-
turned to him. The court of equity decreed that even
though some of the chattels were not of such a natUre that
it would ordinarily have ordered their return, still, since
some of the chattels were of such a nature that their speci-
fic return should be ordered ,the court would follow the
maxim and extend its jurisdiction to include all the chattels;
and the return of the entire list of chattels was therefore
ordered.5
3For a discussion of the doctrine that where equity obtains juris-
diction for one purpose, it retains it to afford complete relief, see
16 Cyc. of Law and Procedure, pps. 106-108 and 133, 134.
'12 Pa. 56 (1849).
6See also Wally v. Wally, 286 Pa. 414 (1926); Moore v. Doyle,
85 Pa. Super. 406 (1925); Allison's Appeal, 77 Pa.221, (1874); Delaware
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Rule 2. Rule (1) will not be applied where only some
incidental feature of the controversy is of equitable cog-
nizance so as to enable the court of equity to decide the
main subject of the controversy, if for the latter there is
an adequate common law remedy. In Graeff v. Felis6 the
court says, "The rule that equity having acquired jurisdic-
tion of the case may decide all matters incidentally connect-
ed with the issue does not apply to a case where only
some incidental matter is of equitable cognizance, and it
is sought to draw in the main subject of controversy which
has a distinct and appropriate remedy of its own."
Rule 3. Where the bill discloses no ground of equit-
able jurisdiction, or where the evidence fails to establish
the allegations in the bill upon which the jurisdiction of
the court of equity is based, the court will not retain the
bill for the purpose of deciding purely common law ques-
tions and enforcing purely common law claims. In the
case of Kerlin v. Kipp,7 the vendee sued the vendor for
specific performance of a written contract for the sale of
real estate. At the hearing, it appeared that the land had
already been sold to an innocent purchaser for value and
that the vendee had knowledge of that fact. The vendee
claimed, nevertheless, that equity should retain jurisdiction
so as to assess the damages caused by the breach of the
contract by the vender. The court, in dismissing the bill,
stated that in such cases there was an adequate remedy at
law and that therefore equity would not retain the bill to
assess the damages.
A seeming exception to this rule is found in the case of
Tidewater Pipe Company v. Bell.8 In that case theTe was
a dispute regarding property and one of the claimants took
forcible possession from the other. Upon a bill in equity
being filed, the court proceeded to restore the original
status and charge the wrongdoer with all costs, expenses
and damages resulting from his wrongful conduct. Then
at the request of the innocent party, the court of equity de-
cided to determine the question of title also, even though
but for the other's wrongful conduct that question would
have been cognizable only in a court of law. The court
& Lackawanna Western Rwy. Co. v. The County Commissioners of
Luzerne County, 241 Pa. 83 (1913); Hurst v. Brennan, 239 Pa. 217
(1913); Holden v. Berstein Manufacturing Co., 232 Pa. 366 (1911).
6200 Pa. 137 (1901).
7207 Pa. 649 (1904). See also Ahl's Appeal, 129 Pa. 63 (1889).
8280 Pa. 104 (1924).
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based its decision upon the fact that the respondent had
failed to challenge the jurisdiction of the court of equity
either by answer or demurrer, and that it therefore had the
right, in following out the maxim under discussion, to de-
cide the question of title. The right of Pennsylvania courts
to so decide such questions can also be sustained under the
act of June 7, 1907, P. L. 440, which states that a defendant
who challenges the jurisdiction in equity, must explicitly
raise this issue by demurrer or answer. But without such
a statute upon which to rely, it is debatable whether a court
of equity should so decide a common law question where
there appears no ground for equitable jurisdiction in the
first instance.
Rule 4. Rule (3) is subject to the qualification that
if the circumstances at the commencement of the action
were such as to warrant the granting of equitable relief,
and the granting of such relief has, during or pending the
suit, become impracticable, the court of equity may retain
the bill and award damages if the plaintiff is entitled there-
to. In Mason's Appeal,' the relief asked for in the bill was an
injunction to prevent the use of a party wall by the defend-
ant. On the hearing the plaintiff showed his title to relief,
but the proofs also showed that the defendant had already
built against the wall. Upon this state of facts, the court,
to prevent a failure of justice, and to avoid further litiga-
tion, ascertained the compensation which should be made to
the plaintiff for the use of the wall. This qualification is
applied to Rule (3) by some courts even though the grant-
ing of the equitable relief had become impracticable at the
time of the commencement of the suit, provided the plain-
tiff did not know the circumstances which had rendered
the equitable remedy impracticable at the time that he
brought suit.10
Rule 5. Rule (1) enables the court to determine only
those questions and rights which are dependent upon or
germane to the main purpose of the bill. It does not enable
the court to decide independent controversies beyond the
scope of that raised by the bill. In Bittenbender v. Kem-
merer and Bittenbender,1 ' there was a bill in equity to set
aside an agreement to dissolve a partnership on the ground
of mental incapacity of the plaintiff when he signed the
970 Pa. 26 (1871). See also Blood v. Erie Dime Savings & Loan
Co., 164 Pa. 95 (1894).
10Latta v. Hax, 219 Pa. 483 (1908).
1185 Pa. 135 (1898).
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agreement. Sufficient evidence was given to show that at
that time the plaintiff was of sound mind. The plaintiff
then asked that equity retain the bill to work out incidental
equities of the parties arising under other controversies.
The court in dismissing the bill denied their jurisdiction so
to do.
Rule 6. Rule (I) operates in favor of the defendant
as well as the plaintiff. In Rosenberger v. Kuesel,'2 there
was a bill in equity for an accounting. It was held that the
court should, so far as was possible, award the fund on hand
so as to give each partner the amount to which he was
entitled under the articles of copartnership; and should, in
addition, enter a decree requiring payment of any unpaid
balance due from one partner to the other. This it should
do in favor of a defendant, if he is legally entitled to be
paid, though he has not filed a crossbill asking for such re-
lief.
Rule 7. The relief incidentally granted under the
operation of Rule (1) must, however, ordinarily be author-
ized by the pleadings. The plaintiff should request it in
his bill specially or should use a prayer for general relief,
and a defendant should ask for such relief in his answer.
In Winton v. Morss,'3 a complainant in equity, who had filed
a bill praying that certain conveyances of real estate be de-
dared to amount to a mortgage, obtained a decree in his
favor, by the terms of which he was declared to be entitled
to a conveyance of said real estate on the payment of cer-
tain sums of money by him to the defendant. The com-
plainant failed to pay such sums, although the conveyances
were executed and tendered by the defendant. It was held
that the court, on the filing by the defendant, of a petition
in the nature of a supplementary bill to enforce the decree,
might order the amount of rent in the hands of the lessee
of said real estate to be paid by him to the defendant, to
apply on the original decree, and that though a court of
equity had no jurisdiction to decree a sale of mortgaged
premises at the instance of a mortgagee, in a distinct and
independent proceeding, is was nevertheless justified, un-
der the circumstances, in ordering a sale of the real estate
in question, if, within a specified time, the amount due by
12292 Pa. 195 (1928); See also Wally v. Wally, supra; Kelly v.
Shay, 206 Pa. 208 (1903); Findley v. Warren, 248 Pa. 315 (1915);
Shingle v. Smyth, 248 Pa. 359 (1915); Winton v. Morss, 97 Pa. 385
(1881).
1897 Pa. 385 (1881). This was before crossbills had been abolished,
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complainant to the defendant was not paid, the purchase
money to be applied on account of the amount so due.
Rule 8. United Drug Company v. Kovacs," is an
authority for the rule that while a court of equity which
has obtained jurisdiction for any purpose will ordinarily
round out the whole circle of controversy between the par-
ties, still it cannot do this as to a right based on a statute
which clearly specifies an entirely different jurisdiction for
establishing and enforcing the liability.
A full and complete discussion of the application of
this maxim cannot be presented in a few rules as stated
above, but, the author feels that these rules cover the vast
majority of the cases wherein the maxim has been followed.
W. HUDSON R. UNGER.
WIDOW'S AND CHILDREN'S EX'EMPTION IN
PENNSYLVANIA.-"The widow shall remain in her hus-o
band's capital mansion house for forty days after his death
during which time her dower shall be assigned. These
forty days are called the widow's quarantine.".' Thus ori-
ginated what today in Pennsylvania is known as the
"widow's and children's exemption." The purpose of such
an allotment is to protect the family from financial dis-
tress in the period immediately following the death of the
husband or father, so that one bereavement be not follow-
ed by another - loss of subsistence.2
The present statutory authorization allowing the
widow's exemption is Section 12a of the Fiduciaries Act of
1917' which, in effect, provides that the widow, or children,
in case of no widow, shall retain property or the proceeds
thereof in the amount of five hundred dollars.. Section 6
of the Intestate Act of 19171 providing that one year's wilful
and malicious desertion by a wife shall forfeit her interest
in the deceased's estate has no application in determining
the validity of a widow's claim for exemption under the
Fiduciaries Act. 5
14279 Pa. 133 (1924).
'Blackstone's Commentaries. Vol. 2, Ch. 8, Page 135.
2Sipes v. Mann, 39 Pa. 414 (1861); McGovern's Estate, 19 Berks
(Pa.) 347 (1927).
8p. L. 447.
4P. L. 829.5Braum's Estate, 86 Pa. Super. 245 (1926); Stauffer's Estate, 89
Pa. Super. $31 1926).
